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1 Developmentalism, Violence,
and Human Rights
We, the post-Second World War South-born, the
now transient generation of Midnight's Children (to
generalise Salman Rushdie's metaphor) have been
there before.
The signposts assume different names
('Westernisation,' 'Socialism,' 'Modernisation',
'Development' and now 'Globalisation') but the
direction is always the one constructed by
'progressive Eurocentrism' (when not entirely an
oxymoron).
In a world enrapt with proclamations of endings
(endo!ogy), worship of icons of endings (endolatry)
and endomania (the resilience of a Fukuyama genre
that survives even a Derridian deconstruction) one
flame never flickers, one metanarrative whose
monopoly never ends: the Idea of Progress, or the
never-ending story of the utopia of reason and
science in service of world capitalism. That Idea, in
its manifold avatars, is at the same time a material
force.
The way we tell stories about the signposts and the
direction also matters a great deal. These phrase-
regimes describing historical processes of Western-
isation, Socialism, Modernisation, Development,
present (to momentarily imitate Habermas) whole
continents of contested conceptions. Each phrase
regime carries its own images of the law as a means
of development. These images form the very stuff
of what Lenin once named the 'world juridical
outlook' (Baxi 1993:l33_62).1
When the stories about development emplot the
subjects of development as the develo pees (to use
legalese), the objects of development, the dominant
'development' discourse manifests most fully its
inherent violence. The developees emerge as
'different and inferior, as having a limited
humanity' (Escobar 1995:54) in relation to the
'developers', whether Euroamerican or indigene,
rarely perplexed by their 'manifest destiny'.
Contemporary critiques of development theory
and practice have just begun to address fully the
histories of the foundational and reiterative
violence of developmentalism (e.g. Escobar 1995;
Esteva and Suri Prakash 1998; Spivak 1999.)
Perhaps, we need to device a Global Truth
Commission on Development, calling the masters
and managers of 'development' theory and practice
to account for the social suffering generated in the
name of development. Hopefully, such a tribunal
will also bring to a fuller view the inner torments
and terrors of the practitioners of development
theories.2
The violence of developmentalism, of all genres, lies
in the material practices of knowledge and power,
which condone and legitimate both the means and
ends of production of structures of social suffering.
Dominant notions about human, social and global
development often entail justifications for practices
of politics of fierce cruelty, as was the case during the
early, middle and late phases of the Cold War. Not
wholly, but in a just measure we now know who are
the prime winners and losers of the development
discourse, policies and planning everywhere.
In the post-Cold War era, dominated by a solitary
'superpower', political theorists have begun to
address the issue of principled hegemony (Brilmayer
1994:22.3). The enunciation of principles turns out
to be very problematic indeed, especially when we
pose the conflict between imperatives of global
justice and duties owed by governments of
developed societies to their co-nationals.3 John
Rawls has recently addressed the problem
differently through the remarkable invention of the
'law of peoples', a notion that generates five types of
society: societies of liberal peoples ('well-ordered'
societies) and of decent peoples; outlaw societies;
societies that are 'benevolent absolutisms' and
societies burdened by unfavourable conditions
(1999:63). The well-ordered societies owe duties of
assistance, in some form or other, to all others save
the outlaw states, which simply ought not be
tolerated because these 'aggressive and dangerous
states, denying human rights altogether, threaten
the structural principles of the law of the peoples'
and 'deeply affect the international climate of power
and violence' (1999:81).
One need not endorse Rawls' position in order to
note the complexity and contradiction involved in
attempts at ethical grounding of the post-Cold War
superpower hegemony Models of human and social
development thus emergent are significantly more
reflexive than those writ large on the Cold War
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developmentalism. Perhaps this movement from
dominance without hegemony (to borrow Ranajit
Guha's notion: Guha (1997)) to principled
hegemony suggests, at the very least, the normative
potential of comparatively less coercive as well as
less violent constructions of development.
In an important sense, contemporary human rights
discourse has contributed a great deal to the radical
critique of developmentalism, even as it in turn also
unmasks the politics of human rights as an integral
aspect of global domination (Baxi: 2000). Even in
the midst of this critique, we need at least to
acknowledge the ways in which human rights
languages and logics have dc-legitimated many a
conception of development. Rights to self-
determination of peoples have discredited
centuries-old notions of human development
justifying a Divine Right to the Empire. No longer
legitimate are conceptions of development that
justify 'equal but separate' treatment resulting in
institutionalised social apartheid. No programme,
policy, or enterprise resting upon gender-based
discrimination or aggression will today be
recognised as 'developmental'. The gradual conv-
ersion of basic human needs into human rights
standards provides important benchmarks by
which any regime of development is now being
increasingly measured.
The endless proliferation of contemporary human
rights norms and standards provides worthwhile
indicators of the millennial 'losers.' International
human rights standards create at least a normative
consensus on naming the constituencies of human
populations who have been deprived, dispossessed
and disadvantaged by the violence of development
paradigms and practice.
This act of naming helps fashion rights strategies
that seek to reverse their development-laden
profile. The United Nations Declaration on the
Right to Development, adopted in 1986, seeks a
reversal of the violence of developmentalism by
reconfiguring the very notion of 'development.' Its
leitmotif is that the 'human person is the central
subject of development' and, therefore, an 'active
participant and beneficiary' of development. States
have a duty to formulate 'appropriate development
policies which aim at the constant improvement
and well-being of the entire population and all
individuals' in ways, which foster 'active, free and
meaningful participation' by all, Popular
participation is to be 'encouraged in all spheres'
because it is both an 'important factor in
development' and essential to 'full realisation of all
human rights'. The logic animating participatory
human rights leads to the abandonment of the 'one-
dimensional concept of the public interest of which
the Government [and one may add the develop-
mental expert[ is the sole judge' (Lucas 1976:243.)
Indeed, Amartya Sen's recent provocative
monograph Development as Freedom (1999) may be
read as a massive footnote to the Declaration
reconstruction of 'development'. His notion of
development as 'the removal of substantive
unfreedoms'(1999:xii) finds an exact parallel in the
Declaration's insistence on the removal of all
'obstacles' in the realisation and the enjoyment of
human rights.
Human rights discursivity provides more than a
register of the politics of inter-governmental desire.
Rather, human rights arise and grow out of the
power of social protest and movement. The
anonymous multitudinous authors of human rights
are peoples exposed to suffering caused by the
dominant paradigms of development, which stand
challenged and combated, in real life, by
communities of resistance (Baxi 1999, 2000).
Howsoever flawed, and distant from the original
intention of these authors, human rights
enunciations make sense only when read as
resonating 'with a suffered injustice, that is negated
word by word, as it were' (Habermas 1996:389.)
Dissociated from the matrix of human suffering and
the powers of resistance, human rights discourse
assumes forms of alienated knowledges leading
only to what has been termed poignantly as
'democratisation of disempowerment' (Ake 1995).
2 Globalisation: Putting Human
Rights to Work
Some normative theories about globalisation carry
the potential for non-violent models of
development, despite the fact that these proselytise,
rather vigorously, the values and virtues of the free
market.
For example, Amartya Sen maintains that we
analytically separate the issue of 'culmination
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outcomes of markets ... in terms of incomes,
utilities and so on' from that of 'reasons for wanting
markets' in the first place. Sen, of course, does not
deny the plenitude of our grounds of anxiety
concerning the market outcomes. However, he
posits the 'freedom to transact' (1999:113), a
freedom to 'buy and sell, to exchange, to seek lives
that can flourish on the basis of transactions'
(p.112). He insists that 'to deny that freedom will
be in itself a major failing of a society'. Invoking an
accurately convenient contribution of Marx, Sen
illustrates how the free market in labour has in
recent times been a force for liberty, progressively
combating substantial unfreedoms (pp.1 13-16).
He insists that 'public discussion and participatory
political decisions' will cure market outcome
distortions against the strength of 'vested' interests:
'in the test of open democracy, public interest may
well have excellent prospects of winning against the
spirited advocacy of small coterie of vested
interests', though Sen is here, uncharacteristically,
short of illustrations. 'Political freedom' thus helps
realise 'the freedom of other kinds (particularly that
of economic openness)' (p.123). To summarise
somewhat crudely, at both the analytical levels,
there is no inherent reason why markets may not be
human rights friendly, or capabilities/human
flourishing or whatever friendly.
Similarly, it has been suggested that the processes of
globalisation secure a more worthwhile future for
human rights. This argument takes general as well
specific forms. At a general level, it is suggested that
the 'global institutionalisation of human rights' is,
in some way or the other, integral to processes of
contemporary globalisation (Robertson 1992).
New social movements derive astonishing levels of
campaign solidarity in cyberspace (Castells 1997).
This achievement is not diminished by the fact that
forces hostile to human rights cultures may also use
information technology to serve their own ends;
indeed, it remains arguable that, despite the rights
disparaging, damaging, or denying potential,
information technology helps create a Habermasian
'public sphere', enabling historically unthinkable
forms of transgressions of the authority of the
nation-state. Spectacular success stories about
cyber-solidarity (such as that achieved by Zapatistas
or the recent triumph over the unreason of
globalisation manifest in the MAI) enable us to
think that the adversial power marshalling
cyberspace paves the way relatively for a more
secure future for human rights.
The Will to Power of the community of states and
of supranational systems now stands matched by an
astonishing accretion of power of NGO
communities, often led by organisations whose
capacity for mobilisation of loyalty, and resources,
far exceeds the power of many a nation-state and
the networks of global power, and every so often
disorganises ït.
At more specific levels, it is maintained that the new
forces of production (mainly digitalisation and
biotechnology) create conditions for fulfilment of
many an economic and social right. Thus, the right
to food is served by inaugural circumstances of the
First and Second Green Revolutions; the right to
health by astonishing developments in pharma-
ceutical biotech industry; the right to freedom of
movement and association by transformations of
transport and communication technology; gender
rights by developments of reproductive
technologies (Baxi 2000), and now even the
probability of human cloning well on the horizon;
the rights to literacy and education by advances in
information and educational technology; the rights
to environment by technological 'sustainable
development' fixes. The list of specifics is endless
(to add yet another example: the global tourism
industry may well enunciate a human right to
global tourism as facilitating meaningful realisation
of human right to leisure!).
In complete plain words, the combination of the
ideology of economic rationalism, new forces of
production, ever-expanding global middle-class
networks of interest, aggregation of humane
development interests through international (and
supranational) civil servants (manifest in the 'voice'
recently affirmed to the NGOs in the dispute-settling
mechanisms of the WTO or the World Bank), the
fraternity of transnationals CEOs, the formation of
international civil society, ail name the ways of
globalisation that put human rights to work. The
message is simple in its clarity and cogency:
globalisation is benign for the future of human rights.
The silver lining in the dark clouds of globalisation
distinguishing it from the earlier formations is the
availability of forms of human rights discursivity,
which enable and empower the critique.
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3 Globalisation: Human Rights at
Risk
Critics of globalisation, however, believe that its
processes, overall, periclate, rather than nurture,
human rights futures. Most human rights-pertinent
criticism emerges from experiences of, or empathy
with, struggle against human, and human rights,
violations caused by policies of contemporary
economic rationalism, promoted in particular by
the international financial institutions, global trade
treaty regimes and regional economic arrange-
ments. These, acting in diverse combination,
produce, for societies unevenly facing the circum-
stances of globality, a veritable encyclopaedia of
human deprivation and suffering, matched only by
the vicious forms of state mercantilism constitutive
of colonial! imperial formation.
Of necessity, critics of globalisation, offer a situated
critique. They avail new forces of information
technology in just the same way that critics of
industrial capitalism put to use its earlier forms
(printing, telegraph, radio and television, for
example.) They acknowledge the social action
facilitative roles of digitalisation and biotech-
nologies. But they contest the notion that the forces
of globalisation are inherently human-rights friendly.
In the main, the critics contest the claim that
globalisation creates circumstances and capabilities
of governance (whether national, regional, or
global) for progressive realisation of economic,
social and cultural rights. They have demonstrated,
for example, that:
The human right to food, or immunity from
hunger, far from being served by advances in
agricultural technologies, has furthered the
interests of global agribusiness, indeed to a point
of creating the potential for 'food dictatorship'
by five leading Northern agribusiness multi-
nationals.
The differential spread of information
technology, despite some of its manifest civil and
political rights-promoting advantages, has
resulted in a new order of international iniquity,
so much so that mass impoverishment
('conditions of extreme poverty,' to put the
matter in the prose of the United Nations
system!) is now being measured in terms of
cyber-deprivation, altering profoundly in the
process the face of public policies of yesteryear
that addressed, one way or the other, the 'real'
rather than the 'virtual', orders of disadvantage,
deprivation and dispossession.
The advances in transport and communications
technology assume an ineradicable dark side,
manifest in sex tourism, mail order brides,
manifold deprivation of the rights of the urban
and rural impoverished in many a forced
urbanisation policy that eliminates their access
to livelihood.
The advances in reproductive technologies, while
no doubt advantaging women claims over
reproductive choice, have also medicalised their
bodies as unredressable experimental sites for
multinational plunder, profit and power (Baxi
2000).
The advances in educational technologies have
added a new twist to the destruction of organic
knowledges, which stand harvested by
pharmaceutical multinationals by way of
biopiracy, wholly subordinating in the process
the orders of millennially formed 'peoples'
knowledges.
The technological sustainable development fixes
mystify, and thus render unaccountable, the
unsustainable patterns of commoditisation of
nature (and human/nature relationship) in ways
that create new markets for pollution (as
through the Kyoto Convention on Climate
Change creating a regime of transactions where
developed nations can 'buy' environmental
protection by internationally sanctioned sale
transactions enabling the South to pollute their
own citizens).
The ways of globalisation make associational
rights of the working classes a fable of an earlier
millennium.
I desist from expanding this description of the
gravamen, in conformity with the canons of global
knowledge production. But this much must be said:
these specific criticisms of globalisation powers and
processes do not as yet amount to critique. The
virtues, values and valour of the activist mode of an
engaged and anguished understanding are
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commendable. But also necessary is a Marx-like
grasp of an entirely new mode of production now
upon us, and the ways in which it alters
understanding of governance, resistance, rights and
justice. Its emergent episteme discredits labours of
thought that dare imagine alternatives to global
capitalism (e.g. Anderson 2000) and is marked by a
steady funeral procession of many a language of
social justice.
Thus, for example, all that seems to remain possible
is a cognitive political economy that, as with
Amartya Sen, impels labours of thought only within
the prison-house of the languages of economic
rationalism, celebrating the distinction between the
rationale and outcomes of free markets, and
therefore disarticulating narrative voices that seek
to lay bare, and contest, the power of
concentrations of technoscientific aggregations (or
the New World Order Inc., as Donna Haraway
names it; see also Kelsey (1999)) The violence of
globalisation no doubt features as a guest artist in
his narrative of development as freedom but, at the
end of the day, Sen universe of discourse re-installs
the Pantheon of classical and neo-classical
economist icons as determinative of all that is worth
saying.
No activist understanding of globalisation processes
and their management, as far as I know, contests
Sen's privileging of human freedom to transact. And
most activists resonate well with his specific
narratives of connectivity of free labour market
archiving the elimination of 'substantial
unfreedoms', howsoever, in a careful public policy
mix of intended and unintended effects.
Critics of globalisation remain unable to grasp Sen
faith in a progressive or human-rights friendly state,
confronted by the New World (Dis) Order.5 The
crude and rude fact generated by globalisation
processes is that the imperatives of global trade and
commerce, of the institutional vested interests of
the Eurocrats and Ecocrats, and the unimaginable
powers of networks of technoscientific powers,
render the Southern states relatively powerless for
the creation of authentic citizen empowerment that
Sen, in the long haul, regards worthy of
performance even by the debilitated formations of
the nation-state sovereignties.
4 The Emergence of a Trade-
Related, Market-Friendly Human
Rights Paradigm
I believe that the paradigm of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is steadily
but surely being replaced by that of trade-related,
market-friendly human rights (TRMF\HR) The
latter seeks to reverse the notion that universal
human rights norms and standards are designed for
the attainment of the dignity and well-being of
human beings and for enhancing the security of
socially, economically and civilizationally vul-
nerable peoples. Instead, the TRMF\HR paradigm
insists on the promotion and protection of the
collective rights of global capital, whose ways justify
corporate well-being and dignity even when these
entail gross, continuing and flagrant violations of
human rights of human beings to be and to remain
human. Indeed, it seeks to redefine the 'human',
consistent with the new forces of production in an
era of globalisation (Baxi:2001).
I present below some enumeration as well as
description of the rights claimed by global capital.
Surely, questions may be raised concerning the
ascription of human rights to corporations. I deal
with these in some detail elsewhere (Baxi 2001).
However, there is enough evidence that corporate
actors affirm and assert these as species of natural
rights, inherent to entrepreneurship, innovation
and economic progress. They also justify these
rights as, in some way or the other, creating
essential conditions (as noted earlier) for better
realisation of social and economic human rights.
Above all, globalisation constantly enhances the
scope and content of TRMF\HR, even to the point
of drawing up as detailed a charter of rights of the
foreign investor as the draft MAI, which explicitly
projected many a hard-won formation of human
rights (rights of workers, environmental rights, for
example) as obstacles to be overcome by state
action.
This stands accomplished, with all its violation and
violence, by the life sciences' reconstruction of the
meaning of life as no more than coded information,
to be prized open for mega-profits by hi-tech
strategic biotech multinationals. Genetic
information becomes a commodity, the new
storehouse of surplus value, at the disposal of
fractions of global capital. The human body
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becomes private, corporate property as illustrated
by the notorious Moore Case, where the California
Supreme Court denies, on the one hand, any order
of property rights in the plaintiffs body tissues, this
being sacrilegious, while allowing full patent rights
exploitation by a pharmaceutical multinational,
holding a joint patent with the University of
California! The possibilities of human cloning have
inaugurated a constitutional and law and
economics-type theoretical discourse in the United
States justifying TRMF\HR in wholesome terms of
the right to scientific research as an aspect of the
inviolable First Amendment and as servicing the
much needed genetic trafficking, so essential to
enhance the progressive realisation of human right
to health (Nussbaum and Sunstein 1998.)
Similarly the processes of digitalisation redefine
human beings as human-machine network, or as
'cyborgs'. The Brave New Worlds already stand
constituted by the regimes of e-commerce, e-social
solidarity, e-governance e-epistemic, and e-
development moral and social entrepreneurship.
Empowering in part (for example, the much vaunted
distribution of access to cell-phones 'empowering'
women in the Grameen Bank movement), digital
capitalism enacts a new global order of violent social
exclusion. The cyber-poor stand redefined as
denizens of 'dead' or' wild' zones (typically
prefigured by a dependent social welfare mother in
the Chicago ghettos: Lash and Urry (1994)). In the
new wasteland of global capitalism, the cyber-poor
emerge as sub-humans, without voice, without face,
without a recognisable capacity to suffer.
tn sum, our labours at redemption of the world are
already, and of necessity, situated in the political
economy of the new forces of production
constitutive of globalisation, affirming the new
paradigm of human rights of global capital. At the
same time, we remain duty-bound (at least some of
us) to pit against it the residues of contemporary
human rights cultures and visions.
This confrontational endeavour (a Gramscian War
of Position?) entails myriad tasks of understanding
and epistemic reversal. We need to grasp the nature
and content of TRMF human rights paradigm.7
Structurally this paradigm re-invents (in E. P
Thompson memorable phrase) the secret state, the
state necessarily beyond the Habermasian 'public
sphere' and of Rawisian models of 'overlapping
consensus,' the Pentagon State in the so-called post-
Cold War era, always conflicted with the rhetoric of
human rights to public participation and freedom
of information, the latter even as allegedly
reconstituted in cyberspace. No addressal of the
role of law in development in low- and middle-
income countries, the thematic of this Conference,
remains sensible outside the ever-increasing shrinking
of the public sphere thus constituted by the globalised
secret state. (By the same token, if you were to
indulge this performative act of political incorrect-
ness, any project proposal to funding agencies will
be still-born by courage that speaks to it!)
The nature and content of theTRMF paradigm of
human rights need to be more fully described, But
the following human rights stand asserted by global
corporations, as aspects of a new global lex
mere atarLa:
The Right to Organised Irresponsibility and
Impunity. To invoke Ulrich Beck's phrase regime
(1992), global corporations assert the powers,
privileges and immunities that place them
beyond the pale of law and other means of
accountability Victims from Bhopal to Ogoni-
land and beyond embody the lived reality of
these orders of irresponsibility and impunity
The Corporate Right to Honour, Dignity and
Privacy. The claims of corporate rights to
honour, dignity and privacy stand constitut-
ionally and legally asserted and protected, even
as against the rights of freedom and speech of
individual human beings and public interest
groups. The 'chilling effects' of SLAPPS
(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:
Pring and Cannon (1996)) remain wholly at
odds with Sen's triumphal notions concerning
the prowess of democratic political
participation.
The Right to Privatise the Genetic Commons. This
set of enforceable claims protects the rights and
powers of hi-tech global corporate industries to
own (via the pathway of intellectual property
rights) biodiversity as well human genetic
materials. In particular, the TRIPS, and its cousin
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TRIMS, encourage the excesses of privatisation
of human futures.
The Right to Corporate Public Participation. Often
emerging as powers to cajole, corrupt and coerce
public policy makers and making. Corporate
public participation rights signify an increasing
appropriation of the public sphere The exercise
of corporate right to free speech and association
has furthered whole patterns of violations of
human rights norms and standards. 'Lobbying,'
campaign and party funding, bribery and
corruption of public officials, 'secret' deals and at
times outright appropriation of law- or rule-
making power are practices that emerge from the
protection of the right of corporations to exist
and their right to claim co-equal rights with
citizens and other natural persons.
5 Towards a Conclusion
The gathering strength of the trade-related market-
friendly human rights is already being presented as
a progress narrative. In this, globalisation incarnates
itself as a more adequate model of transformation,
best mirrored by Amartya Sen in his pioneering
notion of development as freedom. Globalisation
avoids, in this view, the dark side of Westernisation,
modernisation and development theory and
practice. Its present ills can be met (to invert
Gramsci) only though optimism of collective
reason. On this narrative, recipe knowledges of how
to plan social and economic change are already and
abundantly at hand.
A generation ago, I drew attention to the notion of
regression (Baxi 1982). It had no takers then and, I
suspect, will have none today I will, therefore,
spare you the enunciation of this notion. But I see
regression at work in the spectacular ascendancy of
trade-related, market-friendly human rights. I also
see some merit in recalling my view that the world
would be a very different place if it were to produce
at least one theorist of regression per thousand
theorists of development. I may say now that it
might even he a happier place, if taking the notion
of taking regression seriously were to enable some
of us to combat the growing erosion of the
languages of human rights and social justice.
Notes
To illustrate, by way of a rather long note, how the
itineraries of Westemisation vary from the induced
reformation of tradition by voluntary reception of the
'Western' law (as in epochs of Kemal Ataturk or the
Meiji restoration) to the ways of formation of
colonially imposed Westernisation. Elite experiments
at self-induced Westernisation of law offer a radically
different order of experience than those of colonially
enforced processes, resulting in hybrid colonial legal
pluralism. Underlying the imposedlreceived legality
are both intrinsic and instrumental notions about the
historic superiority of the forms and content of the
legalrational Western legal traditions. In its
languages, ideologies and institutional arrangements,
these traditions were represented as constituting the
best path to 'progress'. This path is epitomised, in
different germinal ways, by comparative
jurisprudence that traces, in an evolutionary
paradigm, the movement from 'status' to 'contract,'
'mechanical' to 'organic' solidarity, marking the pre-
eminence of restitutive over repressive sanctions, and
from charismatic law creation, and traditional or
patrimonial domination to a legalrational one. Thus
stood invented, to evoke contemporary hi-tech idiom,
a human juridical genome project.
Critiques of the Westernisation of law, as a
process and heritage, whether cultural or nationalist,
had to fall back on versions of Volksgeist, an impulse
towards 'revivalism,' a politics of nostalgia that
consists, necessarily, in the reinvention of tradition as
also on the pathologies of received /imposed Western
legal traditions and cultures. This assumed myriad
forms, pitting, at the end of the day, the virtues and
values of traditions of corrimunitarian legality that
transcended, at least in cosmological vision, the new
Kantian / Hegelian ways of drawing limit between the
finite and the infinite (Beardsworth 1996:46-74).
Westernisation thus stands posed, at deeply
problematic levels, as Westoxiftcation, and not just in
contemporary constructions of political Islam,
At a level of materiality, what gets transacted in
these discourses are negotiations of competing, and at
times deeply troubled and conflicted, interests
between and among cross-sections of elites, who as far
as possible, also seek to transfer transaction costs or
externalities to different forms of subjugation. A fuller
post-Pasukhanis history of the transaction between
the commodity form and the legal form constituting
these many sites of Westernised legality has yet to be
written. \Vhen it is, we all will stand progressively
empowered to narrate different stories concerning
'fundamentalist/revivalist' critiques of the 'modern'
law
Some of us shelter ourselves in the sanitised policy
science habitus. Some of us cross boundaries, commit
valuable trespasses, by constituting cross, even trans,
disciplinary practices shaping reflexive knowledges.
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Some of us simply reconcile ourselves to belong to
epistemic communities justly nameable as post-
Marxist, postmodern community of knowledge
production. Some others take their positions in the
academe by combining virtues and values of activists
('public citizens' of yesteryear), and locate ourselves
within knowledge/power grids, now led by post-
Fordist philanthropic movements in the market for
human rights, under the auspices of the World Bank
or a Bill Gates or George Sorroes. Those who foster
epistemic practices as a mode of fully fledged
emancipative human praxis run the risk of being
annihilated by regimes of terror, or choose to live in
the diasporic communities of exile.
This is how things are. And we, as individual
human beings, with finite scholarly lifetimes, try our
damnest (my computer suggests replacement by
'dumbest', how cyber-unkind) best to live within the
contradictions of late global capitalism.
3 See Charles Jones (1999) 'Patriotism, Morality, and
Global Justice', in XLI Nomos: Global Justice 125.
4 I have addressed elsewhere (Baxi 1998) the full import
of this Declaration.
5 While they would applaud Sen critique of the Lee
Doctrine concerning the costs that human rights
observance is said to impose on economic
development, they would remain perplexed by a
Nobel Laureate narrative that concedes, at the same
time, that illiberal governance (China, the East Asian
economies) fosters a spread of social opportunities
(such as health, or education) relative to South liberal
democracies (like India, though with the exception of
Kerala), even when the latter handle more humanely
the mass 'famine' syndrome. Carried to its logical end,
it is clear that the denial of human rights is
paradoxically consistent with their 'eventual'
affirmation. Implicit in all this is SenI concern with
reaping the whirlwind of globalisation. Illiberal
regimes seem to have developed a wider spread of
social opportunities and human capital that now
somehow assures for the future of their peoples a more
human rights-oriented democratic governance. In the
meantime, vibrant liberal South democratic systems
must also reinvent a progressive, interventionist state!
To say all this is not to diminish his Nobel Prize-
winning endeavour at humanistic economic analyses.
Nor does one gainsay his noble departures from
thought experiments constituted by a Rawls or a
Nozick. The activist globalisation critique seeks to add
a dangerous supplement to Sen's Real Utopia project,
namely the dimension of dynamic inner contradiction
that renders eligible, as well as legible the analogy
between globalisation scripts and rape scripts (Gibson-
Graham 1996; Baxi 1998.)
1 address these tasks in some detail in my The Future
of Human Rights (2001; in press.)
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